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Abstract
We quantify the effects of monetary policy transparency and credibility on macroeco-
nomic volatility in an estimated model of the euro area economy. In our model, private
agents are unable to distinguish between temporary shocks to the central bank’s monetary
policy rule and persistent shifts in the inflation target, and therefore use optimal filtering
techniques to construct estimates of the future monetary policy stance. We find that
the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing the current level of the time-varying
inflation target are reasonably small as long as private agents correctly understand the
stochastic processes governing the inflation target and the temporary policy shock. If,
on the other hand, private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, the
overall gains of announcing the target can be substantial. We also show that the central
bank to some extent can help private agents in their learning process by responding more
aggressively to deviations of inflation from the target.
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1 Introduction
During the last twenty years many central banks have adopted increasing standards of trans-
parency in communicating their monetary policy objectives, in particular regarding the ex-
plicit definition and quantification of their price stability objective or inflation target. One
important benefit of increased transparency is that of preparing the ground for central banks
increasing their credibility and facilitating the anchoring of private sector inflation expec-
tations in line with stated objectives (see, for instance, Leiderman and Svensson, 1995, or
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999). As economic theory suggests that private
decisions are partly determined by agents’ expectations concerning the future, inflation tar-
geting, by anchoring inflation expectations, should be expected to simplify private agents’
decisions, thereby reducing macroeconomic volatility and increasing overall welfare.
Several authors have produced empirical evidence that inflation targeting coupled with
central bank independence has had the effect of anchoring inflation expectations. For in-
stance, Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) find that private sector inflation forecasts in the
United States (where monetary policy is not guided by an inflation target) are highly corre-
lated with a moving average of lagged inflation, while this correlation is essentially zero in a
number of countries with formal inflation targets. Gu¨rkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) and
Gu¨rkaynak, Levin, Marder, and Swanson (2007) show that long-term inflation expectations
tend to be less responsive to macroeconomic announcements in countries with independent
inflation-targeting central banks, such as Canada, Sweden, or the United Kingdom after 1997,
than in countries where the central bank is either not independent or does not have an explicit
inflation target, for instance the U.S. or the U.K. before formal independence in 1997.
However, there is no strong evidence that this effect on inflation expectations has reduced
macroeconomic volatility in general. While many economies, for instance the U.K. and
Sweden, have performed well after the introduction of inflation targets, other economies
without formal inflation targets, in particular the U.S., have shown similar, or even more
impressive, performance.1
This paper aims at better understanding the links between, on the one hand, monetary
policy credibility and communication and, on the other, private sector expectations and
macroeconomic volatility. We study an empirical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model of the euro area, estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). In our specification
of the model, private agents observe changes in the monetary policy stance (the central
bank’s interest rate instrument), but are unable to distinguish between temporary deviations
from the central bank’s monetary policy rule and permanent shifts in the inflation target.
Agents therefore use the Kalman filter to construct optimal estimates of the current inflation
1Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) instead suggest that the introduc-
tion of a formal inflation target may lead to higher volatility in output, as the central bank shifts its preference
toward stabilizing inflation and the economy moves along a fixed inflation/output volatility frontier. However,
they do not find strong empirical support for this hypothesis. Benati (2006) finds that explicit inflation tar-
geting (as in the U.K., Sweden, Canada, and New Zealand) or the adoption of a quantitative definition of price
stability (as in Switzerland and the euro area) has led to a significantly lower degree of inflation persistence.
Yet he also finds that the U.S. has been able to achieve a low degree of inflation persistence since Chairman
Volcker’s mandate even without announcing an explicit inflation target.
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objective and the temporary monetary policy shock and to make forecasts of the future
path of monetary policy, and they update these estimates and forecasts as more information
arrives. This learning behavior affects private agents’ decisions and therefore all endogenous
variables in the economy, with consequences for macroeconomic volatility in general.
Within this model, we first quantify the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing
the (time-varying) level of the central bank’s inflation objective. Such an announcement
enables private agents to directly observe movements in the central bank’s inflation objective
and temporary deviations from the monetary policy rule. We then study the design of
optimized rules for monetary policy within our framework, assuming a standard objective
function for the central bank. In particular, we analyze whether rules optimized for the full
information specification of the model need to be altered if agents do not observe the central
bank’s inflation objective.
Our results suggest that the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing the current
level of the time-varying inflation target may be reasonably small as long as private agents
correctly understand the stochastic processes governing the unobservable inflation target and
the temporary policy shock and as long as the standard deviation of these shocks remains
relatively small. We find that economic volatility decreases substantially after shocks to
monetary policy. However, as these shocks account for a small fraction of overall volatility
in our economy, the overall gains from announcing the inflation target are fairly small.2 On
the other hand, if private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, the overall
gains of credibly announcing the target can be large.
We also find that optimized monetary policy rules tend to respond more aggressively to
inflation when private agents have imperfect information. By responding more aggressively
to inflation, the central bank helps private agents in their learning process, thus reducing
the deviation of inflation from the target with small consequences for volatility in remaining
macroeconomic variables.
Our model setup is closely related to those of Erceg and Levin (2003), Andolfatto, Hendry,
Moran (2005) and Kozicki and Tinsley (2005). Erceg and Levin (2003) study inflation persis-
tence and the cost of disinflation in a model where private agents cannot distinguish between
temporary and permanent monetary policy shocks which follow stationary autoregressive
processes, as in our setup. Their model is able to generate substantial persistence in inflation
and large costs of disinflation as a consequence of the learning behavior of private agents,
properties that are present also in our model. Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2005) study
the properties of inflation expectations in a model where the temporary shock follows an
autoregressive process but the permanent shock follows a Bernoulli process. They show that
common econometric tests tend to reject the rationality of inflation expectations when pri-
vate agents learn about the properties of monetary policy shocks over time. Relative to these
contributions, our purpose is somewhat broader, as we try to understand the overall costs of
imperfect information about monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic volatility, and we
2Our model is estimated over a period that does not include the great inflation of the 1970s, so monetary
policy shocks are not very volatile and account for a small fraction of overall volatility. It is possible that
the effects of announcing the inflation target would be larger if monetary policy shocks were more volatile.
However, we do not explore this issue here.
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also study the appropriate design of monetary policy.
Moran (2005) uses a similar model to study the welfare effects of reducing the inflation
target when agents learn about the inflation target shift using Bayesian updating. The welfare
benefits are significant when comparing steady states, but much smaller if the transitional
period of learning is also taken into account.
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) use a reduced-form model of the U.S. economy to analyze the
role of imperfect central bank credibility in the economy’s transition to a new level of the
inflation objective. Their model generates a rather large contribution of monetary policy to
the volatility of inflation and other nominal variables after permanent shifts in the inflation
target.
A number of other recent contributions study the consequences for monetary policy of
private sector learning about the general structure of the economy in the stylized “New Key-
nesian” model framework developed by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003),
and others. For instance, Nunes (2005) uses a model where a proportion of private agents
learn about the economic structure, and finds that his model explains well the transitional
dynamics of the economy after a disinflationary shock. Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2005,
2006a, 2006b) show that optimal monetary policy responds more persistently to shocks when
private agents learn about the structure of the economy than with rational expectations,
in order to reduce the persistence and volatility of inflation. Similarly, Molna´r and Santoro
(2006) show that optimal monetary policy responds more aggressively to shocks under private
sector learning than when private agents have rational expectations. We will present similar
results in our framework.
Also in a New Keynesian framework, Orphanides and Williams (2007) study monetary
policy in a small estimated model where the central bank learns about the natural rates of
unemployment and interest and private agents learn about the structure of the economy. They
show that the explicit communication of the central bank’s inflation objective substantially
improves macroeconomic performance under a suboptimal policy, while the gains are fairly
modest under the optimal policy. Rudebusch and Williams (2006) instead study how the
publication of the central bank’s interest rate projections can better align private sector
expectations when private agents either do not observe the coefficients in the monetary policy
rule or the central bank’s target level for inflation. Aoki and Kimura (2007) show that the
learning processes of the central bank and the private sector implies that higher-order beliefs
become relevant, leading to an increase in macroeconomic persistence and volatility. They
also show that private sector learning can reduce macroeconomic volatility over time, and
announcing the inflation objective can help the central bank to estimate the natural rate of
interest.
A different but related strand of the literature explores implications from variability in
the preferences of the central bank or in the inflation objective on the dynamic properties
of the economy, under the assumption that central bank preferences and objectives are per-
fectly observable and credible. Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2007) attribute the decline
in persistence of the inflation gap (defined as the deviation of inflation from the measured
time-varying inflation objective) to the decline in the variance of permanent shocks to a
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time-varying but observable inflation target. Ireland (2007) argues that monetary policy, by
shifting the inflation objective in accordance with realized supply-side shocks, to effectively
accommodate them, has increased the degree of inflation persistence. Finally, Dennis (2006)
and Beechey and O¨sterholm (2007) argue that shifts in the central bank’s preferences, toward
a larger focus on inflation stabilization at the expense of output stabilization, are behind the
lower degrees of macroeconomic persistence and in particular inflation persistence in the U.S.
economy since the time of Volcker’s chairmanship.
In contrast to these papers, as well as those cited earlier, we study an estimated medium-
sized DSGE model often used for quantitative analysis. In particular, we show that while
announcing the inflation target reduces the volatility due to shocks to monetary policy, this
volatility is small relative to that from the remaining shocks in the model. This result partly
reflects the fact that the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks in our model, which
is calibrated for a period with broadly anchored inflation trends, is relatively small compared
for instance to the Great Inflation period.
Finally, similar models have also been used by Beechey (2004) and Gu¨rkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005) to study the relationship between monetary policy and the yield curve.
Beechey uses a stylized model with optimizing agents to study the effects on the yield curve
of central bank private information concerning macroeconomic shocks and the central bank’s
preferences, following Ellingsen and So¨derstro¨m (2001, 2005). In her model, the central
bank sets monetary policy optimally given a quadratic loss function, and private agents use
a Kalman filter to construct estimates of the unobservable shocks. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (2005) use a small macroeconometric model (without complete microfoundations)
to study the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the yield curve. They rationalize
the large response of long-term forward rates found in case studies by a model where the
central bank’s inflation target moves with actual inflation, but the target is unobservable
to the private sector, and private agents use a signal extraction methodology to estimate
the current inflation target from observed movements in the short-term interest rate.3 We
deviate from these authors by studying an estimated medium-scale DSGE model. While our
model is also suited to study the behavior of the yield curve, we focus here on macroeconomic
volatility in general.
Our paper is organized as follows. We present the structure of the model economy,
following Smets and Wouters (2003), and discuss the restrictions on the private sector’s
information set and the Kalman filter used to construct estimates of the two monetary policy
shocks in Section 2. We then present the results concerning volatility in private expectations
and the macroeconomy in Section 3, and we study the design of optimized rules for monetary
policy in Section 4. Finally, we summarize our findings and conclude in Section 5.
3A similar model is also used by Gu¨rkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006).
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2 Model
We use the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model developed and estimated on quar-
terly euro area data by Smets and Wouters (2003).4 We here present briefly the log-linearized
version of the model; we refer to Smets and Wouters (2003) for a more extensive discussion.
2.1 The structural model
Households choose consumption, labor supply, and holdings of a one-period bond to maxi-
mize lifetime utility, which depends on consumption relative to an external habit level and
leisure. Utility maximization subject to a standard budget constraint gives the log-linearized
consumption Euler equation
Ct =
h
1 + h
Ct−1 +
1
1 + h
EtCt+1 − 1− h
σc(1 + h)
[
Rt − Etpit+1 − εbt
]
, (1)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Rt is the nominal one-period interest rate (measured at
a quarterly rate), pit is the one-period rate of inflation, h ∈ [0, 1) determines the importance
of habits, σc > 0 is related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and εbt is a shock
to household preferences.
Households act as price-setters in the labor market, but wages are set in a staggered
fashion: a fraction 1− ξw of wages are reset in a given period, and the remaining fraction is
partially indexed to past inflation. This gives the log-linearized real wage equation
Wt =
β
1 + β
EtWt+1 +
1
1 + β
Wt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etpit+1 − 1 + βγw1 + β pit +
γw
1 + β
pit−1 (2)
− (1− βξw)(1− ξw)λw
[λw + (1 + λw)σl](1 + β)ξw
[
Wt − σlLt − σc1− h (Ct − hCt−1) + ε
l
t
]
+ ηwt ,
where Wt is the real wage, Lt is aggregate labor demand, β ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor,
γw is the degree of wage indexation, σl measures the elasticity of labor supply, λw is the
steady-state wage markup, εlt is a labor supply shock, and η
w
t is a wage markup shock.
Households also own the capital stock, which is rented to firms producing intermediate
goods at the rental rate rkt . They can increase the supply of capital by either investing in new
capital or by changing the utilization rate of installed capital, and both actions are costly in
terms of foregone consumption. The optimal choice of the capital stock, investment and the
utilization rate give the log-linearized conditions
It =
1
1 + β
It−1 +
β
1 + β
EtIt+1 +
1
ϕi(1 + β)
Qt +
1
ϕi(1 + β) [1− βρi(1− τ)]ε
i
t, (3)
Qt = − [Rt − Etpit+1] + β(1− τ)EtQt+1 + [1− β(1− τ)]1 + ψ
ψ
Etrkt+1
+ (1 + β)ϕiη
q
t , (4)
4This model is based on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Other versions of the model include
Smets and Wouters (2005, 2007), Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), and Del Negro, Schorfheide,
Smets, and Wouters (2005). Note that the model specification used here corresponds to that estimated by
Smets and Wouters (2003), and differs slightly from the specification presented in their paper. Frank Smets
and Raf Wouters kindly provided the specification of the estimated model.
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Kt = (1− τ)Kt−1 + τIt−1, (5)
where It is investment, Qt is Tobin’s Q, Kt is the total capital stock, ϕi is the second
derivative of the investment adjustment cost function, τ is the depreciation rate of capital,
ψ is the elasticity of the capital utilization cost function, εit is a shock to the investment cost
function, and ηqt is a shock that captures variations in the external finance premium.
There is a single final good which is produced under perfect competition using a continuum
of intermediate goods. These intermediate goods, in turn, are produced under monopolis-
tic competition using capital and labor inputs with a Cobb-Douglas technology. Prices on
intermediate goods are staggered as in Calvo (1983), so a fraction 1 − ξp of prices are reset
in a given period. The remaining prices are partially indexed to past inflation.5 The opti-
mal price-setting behavior then implies that aggregate inflation is determined by the New
Keynesian Phillips curve
pit =
β
1 + βγp
Etpit+1 +
γp
1 + βγp
pit−1
+
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)
ξp(1 + βγp)
[
αrkt + (1− α)Wt − εat
]
+ ηpt , (6)
where γp is the degree of indexation to past inflation, α is the Cobb-Douglas parameter on
capital, εat is a technology shock, and η
p
t is a price markup shock. Profit optimization also
gives the labor demand function
Lt = −Wt + 1 + ψ
ψ
rkt +Kt−1. (7)
Finally, market clearing implies that
Yt =
αϕy
ψ
rkt + αϕyKt−1 + (1− α)ϕyLt + ϕyεat , (8)
where Yt is the aggregate level of output, and ϕy is equal to 1 plus the share of the fixed cost
in production, and the resource constraint gives
Yt = cyCt + τkyIt + ε
g
t , (9)
where cy and ky are the steady-state ratios of consumption and capital to output, and ε
g
t is
government spending.6
There are eight structural shocks in the model. Three of these—the price and wage
markup shocks ηpt and η
w
t , and the equity premium shock η
q
t—are assumed to be white
noise with variances σ2p, σ
2
w, σ
2
q . The remaining five shocks—to preferences, the investment
adjustment cost, technology, labor supply, and government spending—are assumed to follow
5More recent models instead assume that the prices that are not reoptimized are indexed in part to past
inflation and in part to the (non-zero) inflation target or steady-state inflation (see, for instance, Smets and
Wouters, 2007). This assumption would imply that changes in the perceived inflation target have a direct
effect on price-setting and therefore on welfare (see below).
6Onatski and Williams (2004) add a term on the right-hand-side of equation (9) due to capital utilization
costs, which was omitted in the original Smets and Wouters (2003) model. We choose to use the latter
specification that was estimated on euro area data.
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the stationary autoregressive processes:
εjt = ρjε
j
t−1 + η
j
t , j = b, i, a, l, g, (10)
where ρj ∈ [0, 1), and the innovations ηjt are white noise with variance σ2j .
2.2 Monetary policy
For the specification of monetary policy, we depart slightly from Smets and Wouters (2003)
by assuming that monetary policy is set according to the interest rate rule7
Rt = (1− gr)
{
pi∗t + gpi [pit−1 − pi∗t ] + gy
[
Yt−1 − Y nt−1
]}
+ grRt−1 + εrt . (11)
Thus, the nominal one-period interest rate Rt is a linear combination of the deviation of the
previous period’s rate of inflation pit−1 from the central bank’s current inflation objective
pi∗t , the previous period’s output gap (the log deviation of real output Yt from its natural
level Y nt ),
8 and the previous period’s interest rate.9 There are two exogenous elements in the
policy rule: the inflation objective pi∗t and the monetary policy shock εrt . In general, these
are assumed to follow stationary AR(1) processes:
pi∗t = ρ∗pi
∗
t−1 + η
∗
t , (12)
εrt = ρrε
r
t−1 + η
r
t , (13)
where ρ∗, ρr ∈ [0, 1) and η∗t and ηrt are white noise processes with variances σ2∗ and σ2r .
However, we will assume that the inflation target is very persistent (close to a random walk)
while the monetary policy shock is (almost) white noise.10
2.3 Parameterization
For the structural parameters, we use the calibrated or estimated values from Smets and
Wouters (2003), summarized in Table 1. These estimates were obtained using quarterly data
7Smets and Wouters (2003) instead specify their monetary policy rule as
Rt = (1− gr) {pi∗t + gpi [pit−1 − pi∗t ] + gy [Yt − Y nt ]}
+g∆pi [pit − pit−1] + g∆y [(Yt − Y nt )− (Yt−1 − Y nt−1)] + grRt−1 + εrt ,
and obtain the estimates gpi = 1.684, gy = 0.099, g∆pi = 0.140, g∆y = 0.159, and gr = 0.961. Also, they
estimate the autoregressive coefficient of the inflation target to ρ∗ = 0.924. Using this rule instead of our
rule (11) gives very similar qualitative results. We have also experimented with rules including the current
rate of inflation and output gap, and rules with persistent monetary policy shocks rather than gradual behavior,
as advocated by Rudebusch (2002). Again, the results with these rules are similar to those presented here.
8The natural level of output is defined as the level of output in the equilibrium with flexible wages and
prices, and without the shocks to the wage and price markups and the external finance premium.
9The presence of the past inflation rate and output gap in the policy rule implies that monetary policy
only responds to predetermined variables. Thus, using the terminology of Svensson and Woodford (2004), the
policy rule is an “operational” or “explicit” instrument rule, as opposed to an implicit instrument rule that
includes non-predetermined variables. Such rules are also recommended by McCallum (1997).
10Time variation in the inflation target could be due to true time-variation in the preferred rate of inflation
for an individual central banker, time variation in the composition of the monetary policy committee (and thus
in the average preferred inflation rate of the committee), or time variation in the committee’s concerns for the
zero lower bound of interest rates. We assume that the inflation target is close to a random walk, so changes
in the inflation target are not expected to be reversed immediately, but are seen as close to permanent.
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from the euro area from 1980:2 to 1999:4. For the monetary policy parameters, we will in
Section 3 use a fairly standard calibration of the policy rule (11), with gpi = 2.0, gy = 0.2 and
gr = 0.9, also reported in Table 1, while in Section 4 we will choose the policy rule parameters
to minimize a standard objective function for the central bank. The inflation objective pi∗t
is assumed to be a near-random walk, with ρ∗ = 0.99, while the temporary monetary policy
shock εrt is essentially white noise, with ρr = 0.01. Thus, changes in the inflation objective
are highly persistent (the half-life of a shock is close to 70 quarters), while other deviations
from the policy rule are entirely temporary. The standard deviations of the two monetary
policy shocks are set to the Smets and Wouters (2003) estimates: σ∗ = 0.017 and σr = 0.081
percentage points, respectively. Thus, innovations to the temporary shock are almost five
times as volatile as those to the inflation target.11 However, as the model is estimated on a
sample with changing monetary regimes and high inflation in Europe, the estimated volatility
of the inflation target is likely an upper bound on the true volatility.
2.4 Private sector information
Our key assumption is that private agents are unable to distinguish between the two ex-
ogenous shocks to the monetary policy rule, the inflation objective pi∗t and the temporary
monetary policy shock εrt . However, they are perfectly informed about all other aspects of
the economy. In particular, as they can observe the interest rate Rt, private agents can use
the policy rule (11) to back out the combination
ε̂t = (1− gr)(1− gpi)pi∗t + εrt , (14)
and then use the Kalman filter to calculate optimal estimates of the inflation target pi∗t and
the policy shock εrt .
12 The Kalman filter is thus characterized by the state equation[
pi∗t+1
εrt+1
]
=
[
ρ∗ 0
0 ρr
] [
pi∗t
εrt
]
+
[
η∗t+1
ηrt+1
]
≡ F
[
pi∗t
εrt
]
+
[
η∗t+1
ηrt+1
]
, (15)
and the observation equation
ε̂t =
[
(1− gr)(1− gpi) 1
] [ pi∗t
εrt
]
≡ H ′
[
pi∗t
εrt
]
. (16)
11Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2005) instead model the inflation target as a Bernoulli process, so
occasional shifts in the inflation target are followed by long periods of a constant target. Our specification
implies that the inflation target changes in every period, but with a very low variance. One advantage of this
specification is that the Kalman filter produces optimal forecasts of the future temporary shock and inflation
target.
12As mentioned earlier, this specification is similar to those of Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto,
Hendry, and Moran (2005).
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Optimal forecasts of the future inflation target and policy shock are then calculated as[
Êtpi∗t+1
Êtεrt+1
]
=
(
F − κH ′) [ Êt−1pi∗t
Êt−1εrt
]
+ κH ′
[
pi∗t
εrt
]
, (17)
where κ is the Kalman gain,13 and the optimal estimates of the current target and policy
shock are given by[
Êtpi∗t
Êtεrt
]
= F−1
[
Êtpi∗t+1
Êtεrt+1
]
. (18)
Although private agents’ estimates of pi∗t and εrt do not enter the model explicitly, these
estimates will affect private expectations of future monetary policy, and therefore indirectly
affect all other endogenous variables. As agents learn over time, private expectations are
in general biased predictors of future outcomes. This bias may lead private agents to make
inefficient decisions, and therefore the economy may experience inefficient volatility relative
to the case of perfect information. If the central bank instead were to announce the current
level of the inflation target, pi∗t , private agents would be able to perfectly infer the realization
of the shock εrt , and the perfect-information equilibrium is attainable. We will next study the
effects on macroeconomic volatility of announcing the inflation target, that is, moving from
the equilibrium with imperfect information to that with perfect information.
3 Macroeconomic dynamics and volatility
We now study the dynamics of our model economy, first in terms of impulse responses to the
two monetary policy shocks, and then in terms of the volatility of simulated time series.
3.1 The effects of monetary policy shocks
Figures 1–2 show impulse responses to one-standard-deviation-sized innovations to the in-
flation objective and the temporary monetary policy shock, respectively. The solid lines
represent the impulse responses (and forecasts) in the benchmark case of full information
(when all shocks are observable), the dash-dotted lines represent optimal forecasts with im-
13To determine the Kalman gain κ, let Σ be the variance-covariance matrix of
[
η∗t+1 η
r
t+1
]′
and let
Pt+1|t denote the mean-squared error of the forecast of ξt+1 ≡
[
pi∗t+1 ε
r
t+1
]′
, that is,
Pt+1|t = E
[(
ξt+1 − Êtξt+1
)(
ξt+1 − Êtξt+1
)′]
.
Starting from the unconditional mean-squared error, given by
vec(P1|0) = (I − F ⊗ F )−1 vec(Σ),
the Kalman gain matrix and the mean-squared error are found by iterating on
κt = FPt|t−1H
(
H ′Pt|t−1H
)−1
,
Pt+1|t =
(
F − κtH ′
)
Pt|t−1
(
F − κtH ′
)′
+Σ.
See Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13) for details. Thus, the Kalman gain depends on all elements of F , H, and Σ, that
is on gpi, gr, ρ∗, ρr, σ∗, and σr.
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perfect information, and the dashed lines show the effects of shocks on the economy when
there is imperfect information and agents learn over time.14
Consider first the case of full information, represented by the solid lines in Figures 1–
2. Figure 1 shows impulse responses and forecasts after a negative shock to the inflation
target pi∗t . With full information, private agents immediately notice that the inflation target
has decreased, so the perceived target jumps down to its new level and agents adjust their
expectations accordingly. As a consequence there is a fall in inflation in the initial period,
and the central bank is able to increase the real interest rate with only a slight increase in
the nominal interest rate, which is soon reversed. This leads to a decrease in consumption,
investment, output, employment, and the real wage, and therefore a fall in inflation. When
inflation and the time-varying inflation target are close, they move back together to the initial
level, and the nominal interest rate follows them back. The real interest rate is therefore close
to its neutral level, and all real variables return toward steady state. There is thus a hump-
shaped response of all variables, with the maximum effect on output (around 5 basis points)
after four to six quarters.
After a positive innovation to the temporary monetary policy shock εrt in Figure 2, the
interest rate increases by the full amount of the shock (32 basis points), and the real interest
rate increases even more as expected inflation falls. This leads to a reduction in all real
variables, which motivates the fall in inflation. Again, all responses are hump-shaped, and
the maximum effects on output (−20 basis points) and inflation (−4 basis points) occur after
three quarters.
Introducing imperfect information, private agents use the Kalman filter to make optimal
estimates of the current and future inflation target and policy shock, and adjust their expec-
tations accordingly. Figure 1 shows that after a negative inflation target shock a persistent
increase in the interest rate is necessary to reduce inflation expectations. Private agents
observe the small increase in the nominal interest rate, and they attribute this partly to a
negative inflation target shock and partly to a positive temporary policy shock. As they know
that the inflation target is much less volatile than the temporary shock, their optimal esti-
mate of the inflation target initially falls very little (by 0.09 basis points) while the estimate
of the temporary shock increases more (by 0.67 basis points).
As time goes by the central bank increases the interest rate further, and when agents
update their information set they find it increasingly likely that the inflation target has in
fact decreased. Therefore inflation falls further and all real variables continue to fall as the
real interest rate increases. As agents learn, the perceived and actual inflation target slowly
converge and the perceived temporary monetary policy shock approaches zero. This slow
learning process implies that all variables respond more gradually and persistently to the
inflation target shock than with full information, and the maximum effects on output now
occur after 12 quarters. As in Erceg and Levin (2003) and Nunes (2005), the presence of
imperfect information substantially increases the real cost of disinflation.
After a temporary policy shock in Figure 2 private agents again observe an increase in the
14In all figures and tables, the inflation and interest rates are measured on an annualized basis. Appendix A
outlines how we simulate the model and construct impulse responses with imperfect information.
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nominal interest rate and attribute almost all of this (32 basis points) to a positive temporary
shock and very little (four basis points) to a negative inflation target shock. In the initial
period, the main difference compared with the full information case is a larger fall in inflation,
as private agents believe that the inflation objective is lower. Thus, the same increase in the
interest rate leads to a larger increase in the real interest rate with imperfect information,
and therefore a larger effect on real variables.
As agents learn over time, the monetary policy tightening leads to a slightly deeper
recession than under full information, and the central bank needs to lower the interest rate
below the initial level to stimulate the economy. The real variables then return toward steady
state, often with some overshooting, while inflation and the interest rate return very slowly
to the initial level together with the perceived inflation target.
To summarize, imperfect information about the two policy shocks implies that agents
optimally attribute almost all unexpected movements in the nominal interest rate to the
more volatile temporary shock, and very little to the persistent inflation target shock, which
is less volatile. In order to persuade private agents that the inflation target is lower the
central bank needs to tighten policy more, resulting in a deeper recession. The learning
process implies that all variables respond more gradually to an inflation target shock with
imperfect than with full information. The temporary policy shock, on the other hand, has
very similar effects under imperfect and full information, as agents attribute most of the
unexpected interest rate movement to the temporary shock.
3.2 Imperfect information and macroeconomic volatility
It is clear from the impulse responses and forecasts in Figures 1–2 that imperfect information
about the two monetary policy shocks has large effects on the dynamic behavior of the
economy and private sector forecasts, in particular after shocks to the inflation target. This
impression is confirmed by Panel (a) of Table 2, which shows the variance in some key
macroeconomic variables in the model that is due to the two monetary policy shocks.15
Conditional on the two monetary policy shocks, most variables are considerably more
volatile under imperfect information than with full information, with the exception of inflation
and the interest rate. The variance of the real variables due to monetary policy shocks is 20
to 25 percent larger with imperfect information than with full information, while inflation
and the nominal interest rate are considerably less volatile with imperfect information. Going
back to Figures 1 and 2 reveals that this effect on volatility is mainly due to the effect of shocks
to the inflation target, where the response of all real variables is more gradual with imperfect
information, leading to larger volatility. As inflation target shocks have a smaller impact on
inflation and the interest rate with imperfect information than with full information, these
variables are also less volatile. Thus, imperfect information about the monetary policy shocks
has an important impact on macroeconomic volatility, conditional on the two monetary policy
shocks.
However, as the remaining eight shocks are observable to the private sector and therefore
15The reported variances are averages across 1,000 simulated samples of 10,000 observations (after discarding
the initial 500 observations). Inflation and the interest rate are in annualized terms, so p¯it = 4pit and R¯t = 4Rt.
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are not affected by the information restrictions, the total effect of imperfect information on
macroeconomic volatility depends on the overall contribution of the monetary policy shocks
to volatility. Panel (b) of Table 2 reports the effects of imperfect information on aggregate
volatility. This panel reveals that imperfect information has very small effects on the volatility
of macroeconomic variables once we take into account all structural shocks: the variance of
most real variables increases by less than one percent. The largest effects are in terms of
inflation and interest rate volatility, which is lower with imperfect information, and on the
volatility of inflation around the target, which is substantially higher. This is because actual
inflation adjusts slowly to changes in the inflation target when private agents cannot directly
observe the target (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, the overall effects of imperfect information on
macroeconomic volatility—and thus the potential benefits of credibly announcing the central
bank’s target for inflation—seem modest.16
3.3 The role of private sector information about monetary policy shock processes
The above results suggest that there are small effects of imperfect information on macroeco-
nomic volatility, and therefore that the gains of announcing the exact inflation target are
small. However, as discussed earlier, the response of private expectations to the unobservable
shocks depends crucially on the perceived volatility of the shocks. In the benchmark cali-
bration, the temporary shock is considerably more volatile than the inflation target shock.
Private agents therefore attribute a small fraction of the unexpected movement in the interest
rate to the inflation target and a large fraction to the temporary shock, with a small effect
on overall volatility as a result.
If the central bank is unwilling to announce its inflation target, it may be difficult for
private agents to estimate the variance of the target. In this section, we therefore analyze
an alternative scenario where private agents overestimate the variance of the inflation target.
In particular, we set the perceived standard deviation of the inflation target five times larger
than the actual standard deviation, so the perceived standard deviation is σˆ∗ = 0.085, which
is of similar magnitude as the standard deviation of the temporary policy shock. In this
situation, private agents will attribute a greater part of the unexpected movements in the
interest rate to inflation target shocks than when they know the true variance of the inflation
target.
To illustrate how private agents’ perceptions affect the speed with which they update their
forecasts as new information arrives, Figures 3–4 show how the sensitivity of the optimal
forecasts for the inflation target and the temporary policy shock to the observed interest
rate depends on the perceived coefficients in the monetary policy rule and the persistence
and volatility of the two monetary policy shocks.17 Figure 3 reveals that private agents’
16Note that also in the case of full information the inflation target is not constant but varies over time.
However, as the volatility of the inflation target is very low, the outcome with a known constant inflation
target is very similar to the full information case reported here.
17The figures thus plot the two updating coefficients in the Kalman gain κ in equation (17) as a function
of gpi, gr, ρ∗, ρr, σ∗, and σr. Rudebusch and Williams (2006) also discuss how the private sector’s information
set affects the optimal updating scheme in a model where private agents are unable to observe the inflation
target and the central bank helps private agents by publishing its forecast for the interest rate.
12
inflation target forecast is more sensitive to unexpected changes in the observed interest rate
when either the central bank is more responsive to inflation deviations from target (when
gpi is large) or when the inflation target process is seen to be more persistent or volatile
(so ρ∗ or σ∗ are large).18 A larger central bank response to the lagged interest rate or
more persistence or volatility in the temporary policy shock instead reduce the effect of
new information on the inflation target forecast. Figure 4 shows the opposite pattern for
the sensitivity of the temporary shock forecast. In our benchmark calibration (marked by
vertical lines in the figures), private agents’ forecast are particularly sensitive to the perceived
volatility of the inflation target: an increase in the perceived volatility leads to much larger
effects of unexpected interest rate movements on the optimal inflation target forecast but
smaller effects on the forecast of the temporary shock.
Figures 5–6 show impulse responses to innovations to the two monetary policy shocks
when private agents overestimate the variance of the inflation target. (The responses under
full information are of course the same as in Figures 1–2.) After an inflation target shock
in Figure 5, the larger movements in the perceived inflation target imply that inflation falls
faster than when private agents know the variance of the inflation target. The increase in the
nominal interest rate now translates into a larger increase in the real interest rate than when
private agents know the true variance of the inflation target, with a deeper and less gradual
recession as a result. The central bank reduces the nominal interest rate toward the new
target level more quickly, and as the perceived inflation target approaches the true target, all
real variables and inflation return to their steady-state levels earlier than before. Thus, the
negative humps in the impulse responses are deeper but less persistent than before.
After a temporary policy shock in Figure 6, there are now larger differences compared
with the full information case, as the initial interest rate increase is translated into a much
larger fall in the perceived inflation target, leading to lower inflation, a higher real interest
rate and a deeper initial recession. The central bank then quickly reduces the interest rate,
and all variables return toward steady state with some over-shooting.
In general, when private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, both
shocks have larger but less persistent effects on all variables. As private agents’ estimate of
the inflation target is more sensitive to shocks, actual inflation also responds more to these
shocks, translating into larger movements in the real interest rate and the other real variables.
Table 3 shows that all variables are now considerably more volatile than with full informa-
tion, in particular inflation, the output gap, and the interest rate, but also the real variables,
whose variances increase by around five percent relative to the full information case. Thus,
allowing for imperfect information not only regarding the shocks to the monetary policy rule
but also regarding the variance of these shocks, our model is able to generate fairly large
effects of imperfect information on macroeconomic volatility. As a consequence, the gains
in terms of macroeconomic stability from announcing the central bank’s inflation target are
reasonably large.
18Note that the inflation target forecast responds negatively to the observed interest rate, as an interest rate
increase signals a decrease in the target.
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4 Optimized monetary policy rules and imperfect credibility
We now study the properties of optimized rules for monetary policy within our framework.
We assume that the central bank aims to stabilize inflation around the inflation target, the
output gap, and the interest rate by minimizing the loss function
Lt = Var (p¯it − p¯i∗t ) + λyVar (Yt − Y nt ) + λrVar
(
R¯t
)
, (19)
where p¯it, p¯i∗t , and R¯t measure inflation, the inflation target and the nominal interest rate in
annualized terms, so, for example, p¯it ≡ 4pit. While this objective function does not represent
the welfare of a representative household in our economy, it is consistent with the mandates
of most central banks.19 We assume that the central bank preference parameters are given
by λy = 0.5 and λr = 0.1, so the central bank attaches a larger weight to inflation stability
than to output gap stability, and a small weight to stability in the interest rate.20
We first choose the coefficients in the central bank’s policy rule (11) to minimize the
central bank loss function when private agents have perfect information about the inflation
target and the temporary monetary policy shock.21 We then evaluate this optimized rule in
the case of imperfect information concerning the inflation target. Finally, we discuss whether
deviating from the optimized rule may improve on the outcome of monetary policy when
private agents do not have full information about the inflation target.
The coefficients that minimize the value of the loss function (19) in the case of full
information are given by gpi = 10.740, gy = 2.159, gr = 0.958, and Panel (a) of Table 4
reports the outcome for the three alternative models under this rule, along with the value of
the loss function (19). For comparison, Panel (b) reports the corresponding results for the
calibrated rule analyzed in Section 3.
Relative to typical parameterizations of monetary policy rules (and the calibrated rule
used earlier), the optimized rule responds more aggressively to both inflation and the output
gap and is also slightly more inertial.22 Comparing the first rows of panels (a) and (b) of
Table 4 shows that this more aggressive rule is considerably more efficient than the calibrated
rule in stabilizing the output gap, at the cost of higher volatility in inflation around the target
and the interest rate.
19A proper welfare analysis would instead use an approximation of the representative household’s utility as
the central bank loss function (see, for instance, Woodford, 2003). In this case, the assumptions concerning
firms’ price-setting would have a direct impact on the welfare criterion. If, as in our model, prices are indexed
only to past inflation, the inflation target does not direcly affect private sector behavior, and therefore the
utility-based loss function would not depend on the volatility of the inflation target. If instead prices were
indexed to the (perceived) inflation target, changes in the target would have direct welfare effects.
20The interest rate stabilization objective can be seen as a proxy for stability on financial markets. For
instance, Tinsley (1999) argues that interest rate volatility may increase term premia and therefore lead to
higher long-term interest rates. From a theoretical perspective, Woodford (2003) shows that the welfare-
maximizing policy should aim at reducing interest rate volatility when there are money transaction frictions
or when the central bank wants to avoid the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
21When optimizing the policy rule coefficients, we retain the temporary shocks to the policy rule, even if
these are suboptimal. This is in order to compare with the case of imperfect information, in which case the
temporary shocks are necessary to generate a non-trivial learning problem.
22It is not uncommon for optimized policy rules to be more aggressive than estimated rules. This result is
often attributed to the fact that the optimized rules do not take into account different sources of uncertainty
that may make policy more cautions. See, for instance, Rudebusch (2001) or Cateau (2005).
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We then implement the rule optimized for the full information model in the models with
imperfect information. Panel (a) of Table 4 shows that the presence of imperfect information
(when agents know the true variance of the inflation target) leads to modest increases in
the volatility of the real variables, as well as the output gap and inflation around target.
Thus, the value of the loss function is only slightly higher than with full information: the
increase in loss when moving from full information to imperfect information is equivalent to a
permanent deviation of inflation from target of 0.02 percent.23 Assuming that private agents
also overestimate the variance of the inflation target leads to a further increase in volatility
and loss, but again the effects are modest: the difference relative to the full information case
is now equivalent to a permanent inflation gap of 0.03 percent. However, comparing with the
calibrated rule in Panel (b) reveals that the central bank is able to substantially reduce the
effects of imperfect information by optimizing the policy rule. Under the calibrated rule, the
presence of imperfect information is equivalent to a permanent inflation gap of 0.34 and 0.45
percent, respectively, for the two specifications of imperfect information.24
To analyze the effects of imperfect information on the optimized policy rule, we study
the performance of six alternative rules, where we let one policy rule coefficient at a time
deviate by 10 percent from the optimized rule while keeping the remaining coefficients at
their optimized levels.25 The results are reported in Table 5.
By construction, any deviations from the optimized rule will increase loss in the full
information model, but Panel (a) of Table 5 shows that the effects of deviating from the
optimized coefficients on inflation or the output gap are very small. On the other hand, it
is more costly to deviate from the optimized coefficient on the lagged interest rate: reducing
the interest rate coefficient by 10 percent increases loss substantially, and increasing the
coefficient to 0.99 almost even more so.26
Panel (b) shows the results for the model where private agents have imperfect information,
but know the true variance of the inflation target. Now, deviations from the optimized rule
do not necessarily increase loss, as the rule is optimized for the full information model.
Nevertheless, also in this case all deviations from the optimized rule increase loss, and the
results are similar to the case of full information.
23To see this, consider the quadratic version of the loss function (19) given by
Lt = (1− β̂)Et
∞∑
j=0
β̂j
[(
pit+j − pi∗t+j
)2
+ λy
(
Yt+j − Y nt+j
)2
+ λrR
2
t+j
]
,
which approaches the specification in equation (19) as the central bank discount factor β̂ approaches one. A
permanent inflation gap of x percent then implies a value of the loss function of (1 − β̂)∑∞
j=0
β̂jx2 = x2.
Denoting by L0 the loss under full information and by L1 the loss under imperfect information, the permanent
inflation gap that would be equivalent to moving from full information to imperfect information is given by
x =
√
L1 −
√
L0.
24A similar result is obtained by Orphanides and Williams (2007).
25The coefficient of the lagged interest rate is not allowed to be larger than 0.99.
26One reason for why there are large costs of deviating from the optimized degree of policy inertia is that the
long-term responses to inflation and the output gap (given by gpi and gy) are kept unchanged in this exercise.
Therefore, adjusting the coefficient on the lagged interest rate also affects the short-term responses to inflation
and output, given by (1− gr)gpi and (1− gr)gy.
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Finally, Panel (c) shows the results when agents have imperfect information about the
monetary policy shocks and overestimate the variance of the inflation target. In this case, the
central bank is better off responding more aggressively to inflation or the output gap than
under full information (although the gains are very small). As before, a large coefficient on
the lagged interest rate is detrimental to central bank loss, even more so than in the other two
cases. The reported variances show that responding more aggressively to inflation implies
that inflation follows the inflation target more closely, at the cost of small increases in output
and interest rate volatility. Under imperfect information when private agents overestimate the
volatility of the inflation target, the inflation gap is more volatile than under full information.
By responding more aggressively to the inflation deviation from target, the central bank helps
private agents to learn the inflation target more quickly (see Figure 3), which tends to reduce
overall volatility.27 It is also clear, however, that the aggressive policy rule is not a perfect
substitute for announcing the inflation target: moving from imperfect information to full
information would reduce the value of the loss function considerably more than responding
more aggressively to inflation.
5 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to measure the effects of monetary policy transparency and credi-
bility on macroeconomic volatility and welfare. To this aim we use an estimated DSGE model
of the euro area economy where private agents are unable to distinguish between persistent
movements in the central bank’s inflation target and temporary deviations from the monetary
policy rule.
Our model implies that the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing the current
level of the time-varying inflation target are reasonably small as long as private agents cor-
rectly understand the stochastic processes governing the inflation target and the temporary
policy shock. While economic volatility decreases substantially after shocks to monetary
policy, these shocks account for a small fraction of overall volatility in the economy. The
overall gains from announcing the time-varying inflation target are therefore fairly small.
However, if private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, the overall gains
of announcing the target can be substantial.
We have also demonstrated that the central bank to some extent can help private agents
in their learning process by responding more aggressively to inflation. Assuming a standard
objective function for monetary policy, our results suggest that the optimal response to
inflation is more aggressive when private agents have imperfect information and overestimate
the volatility of the inflation target than when private agents have full information.
As our model is derived from the optimizing behavior of private agents, our framework
can also be used to study the welfare effects of imperfect monetary policy credibility and
transparency, for instance, using a linear-quadratic approximation of welfare in our model,
following Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Altissimo, Cu´rdia, and Rodr´ıguez Palenzuela
(2005). We plan to pursue this avenue in future work.
27Similar results are obtained by Molna´r and Santoro (2006) and Orphanides and Williams (2007) in models
where private agents learn about the processes for inflation, output (or unemployment), and the interest rate.
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A Simulating the model with learning
The solution of the model is given by
zt = Azt−1 +Bηt, (A1)
zt is a vector that includes the variables in the sticky price/wage model (13 equations), the
Kalman filter variables Etpi∗t+1,Etεrt+1,Etpi∗t , and Etεrt (4 equations), the flexible price/wage
model (9 equations), and the 10 shock processes, including pi∗t and εrt , while ηt is a vector
that includes the 10 innovations.
Under imperfect information, the shocks to the inflation target (η∗t ) and the monetary
policy rule (ηrt ) are not directly observable to private agents. Instead, in each period t
private agents observe the interest rate Rt, use the Kalman filter to update their estimate of
pi∗t and εrt , and then adjust their expectations of future monetary policy, inflation, and output
accordingly. As time goes by, the observed interest rate differs from agents’ expectations, so
agents continue to update their information and adjust their expectations. To capture this
process we feed in the change in agents’ estimate of pi∗t and εrt as new “shocks” in each period
by calculating[
Eˆtη∗t
Eˆtηrt
]
=
[
Eˆtpi∗t
Eˆtεrt
]
−
[
Eˆt−1pi∗t
Eˆt−1εrt
]
= F−1
[
Eˆtpi∗t+1
Eˆtεrt+1
]
−
[
Eˆt−1pi∗t
Eˆt−1εrt
]
=
[
F−1
(
F − κH ′)− I] [ Eˆt−1pi∗t
Eˆt−1εrt
]
+ F−1κH ′
[
pi∗t
εrt
]
, (A2)
and we add the shocks Etη∗t ,Etηrt in the innovation vector ηt, and the forecasts Etpi∗t ,Etεrt
among the shock processes in the vector zt. (These Etpi∗t ,Etεrt coincide with those from the
Kalman filter.) This gives a total of 26 endogenous variables and 12 autoregressive shocks in
the vector zt and 12 innovations in the vector ηt.
Finally, we need to modify the model solution (A1) to take into account the effect of
learning on the endogenous variables: while the central bank responds to the true pi∗t , εrt ,
private agents respond to Etpi∗t ,Etεrt . We do this by reshuﬄing the matrices A and B so
that the columns corresponding to pi∗t , εrt , η∗t , and ηrt in the private sector equations (all
equations except the interest rate rule) are moved to the positions of Etpi∗t ,Etεrt ,Etη∗t , and
Etηrt . Simulating the model with the learning shocks described above then gives the evolution
of the economy.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
Calibrated parameters
β 0.99 Discount factor
τ 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
α 0.30 Capital share in production
ky 8.8 Capital/output ratio
cy 0.60 Consumption/output ratio
λw 0.5 Average wage markup
Estimated structural parameters
ϕi 6.771 Investment adjustment cost parameter
σc 1.353 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
h 0.573 Consumption habit parameter
σl 2.400 Elasticity of labor supply
ϕy 1.408 Fixed cost in production
ψ 0.169 Elasticity of capital utilization cost function
ξw 0.737 Calvo wage parameter
ξp 0.908 Calvo price parameter
γw 0.763 Rate of wage indexation
γp 0.469 Rate of price indexation
Estimated autoregressive parameters
ρb 0.855 Preference shock
ρi 0.927 Investment cost shock
ρa 0.823 Productivity shock
ρl 0.889 Labor supply shock
ρg 0.949 Government spending shock
Estimated standard deviations
σb 0.336 Preference shock
σi 0.085 Investment cost shock
σq 0.604 Equity premium shock
σa 0.598 Productivity shock
σp 0.160 Price markup shock
σw 0.289 Wage markup shock
σl 3.520 Labor supply shock
σg 0.325 Government spending shock
σ∗ 0.017 Inflation objective
σr 0.081 Temporary monetary policy shock
Calibrated monetary policy parameters
gpi 2.0 Coefficient on inflation
gy 0.2 Coefficient on output gap
gr 0.9 Coefficient on lagged interest rate
ρ∗ 0.99 Persistence in inflation objective
ρr 0.01 Persistence in temporary monetary policy shock
The estimated parameter values are taken from Smets and Wouters’s (2003) estimates (the mode of the
estimated posterior distribution) on euro area data from 1980:2 to 1999:4.
21
Table 2: Variances of simulated data under full and imperfect information
Ct Yt It Lt Wt p¯it Yt − Y nt R¯t p¯it − p¯i∗t
(a) Monetary policy shocks only
Full information 0.21 0.24 1.15 0.094 0.068 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.025
Imperfect information 0.26 0.30 1.44 0.12 0.079 0.089 0.30 0.35 0.15
(b) All shocks
Full information 6.89 7.12 77.23 3.54 1.60 1.34 3.76 1.29 1.22
Imperfect information 6.94 7.18 77.51 3.57 1.61 1.29 3.82 1.22 1.34
This table reports simulated variances (averages over 1,000 simulated series of 10,000 observations) in the
models with full information and with imperfect information. Inflation and the interest rate are in annualized
terms: p¯it = 4pit and R¯t = 4Rt.
Table 3: Variances of simulated data when private agents overestimate the volatility of the
inflation target
Ct Yt It Lt Wt p¯it Yt − Y nt R¯t p¯it − p¯i∗t
(a) Monetary policy shocks only
Full information 0.21 0.24 1.15 0.094 0.068 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.025
Imperfect information 0.52 0.64 3.26 0.27 0.14 0.43 0.64 0.61 0.36
(b) All shocks
Full information 6.89 7.12 77.23 3.54 1.60 1.34 3.76 1.29 1.22
Imperfect information 7.19 7.51 79.34 3.72 1.68 1.62 4.15 1.48 1.55
This table reports simulated variances (averages over 1,000 simulated series of 10,000 observations) in the
models with full information and with imperfect information when private agents overestimate the volatility
of the inflation target: σˆ∗ = 5σ∗. Inflation and the interest rate are in annualized terms: p¯it = 4pit and
R¯t = 4Rt.
Table 4: Performance of optimized and calibrated monetary policy rules
Simulated variances Loss
Ct Yt It Lt Wt p¯it Yt − Y nt R¯t p¯it − p¯i∗t
(a) Optimized rule
Full info 7.86 9.17 92.93 3.95 1.62 1.56 1.67 3.15 1.43 2.580
Imp info, σˆ∗ = σ∗ 7.89 9.20 93.05 3.97 1.63 1.54 1.70 3.14 1.47 2.639
Imp info, σˆ∗ = 5σ∗ 7.94 9.23 93.13 3.98 1.63 1.61 1.73 3.15 1.49 2.677
(b) Calibrated rule
Full info 6.89 7.12 77.23 3.54 1.60 1.34 3.76 1.29 1.22 3.238
Imp info, σˆ∗ = σ∗ 6.94 7.18 77.51 3.57 1.61 1.29 3.82 1.22 1.34 3.380
Imp info, σˆ∗ = 5σ∗ 7.19 7.51 79.34 3.72 1.68 1.62 4.15 1.48 1.55 3.785
This table reports simulated variances (averages over 1,000 simulated series of 10,000 observations) in the
models with full information and with imperfect information. The optimized rule is the parameterization of
the policy rule (11) that minimizes the loss function (19) with λy = 0.5 and λr = 0.1 under full information,
and is given by gpi = 10.740, gy = 2.159, gr = 0.958. The calibrated rule is given by gpi = 2.0, gy = 0.2,
gr = 0.9.
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Table 5: Performance of alternative monetary policy rules
Simulated variances Loss
p¯it Yt − Y nt R¯t p¯it − p¯i∗t
(a) Full information
Optimized rule 1.56 1.67 3.15 1.43 2.580
Large gpi 1.51 1.76 3.32 1.37 2.586
Small gpi 1.62 1.57 2.98 1.50 2.588
Large gy 1.61 1.54 3.26 1.48 2.585
Small gy 1.51 1.82 3.04 1.37 2.586
Large gr 1.66 3.10 1.09 1.53 3.196
Small gr 1.55 1.32 8.86 1.42 2.966
(b) Imperfect information, σˆ∗ = σ∗
Optimized rule 1.54 1.70 3.14 1.47 2.639
Large gpi 1.49 1.80 3.32 1.41 2.642
Small gpi 1.60 1.61 2.98 1.54 2.648
Large gy 1.59 1.57 3.25 1.52 2.640
Small gy 1.49 1.86 3.03 1.41 2.647
Large gr 1.63 3.26 1.02 1.65 3.389
Small gr 1.54 1.33 8.91 1.43 2.988
(c) Imperfect information, σˆ∗ = 5σ∗
Optimized rule 1.61 1.73 3.15 1.49 2.677
Large gpi 1.56 1.83 3.31 1.43 2.673
Small gpi 1.68 1.64 3.00 1.57 2.694
Large gy 1.66 1.60 3.26 1.54 2.675
Small gy 1.56 1.89 3.04 1.43 2.689
Large gr 2.06 3.99 1.27 1.98 4.099
Small gr 1.56 1.33 8.85 1.43 2.980
This table reports simulated variances (averages over 1,000 simulated series of 10,000 observations) in the
models with full information and with imperfect information for different parameterizations of the monetary
policy rule (11). The optimized rule is the parameterization that minimizes the loss function (19) with
λy = 0.5, λr = 0.1 under full information, and is given by gpi = 10.740, gy = 2.159, gr = 0.958. “Large” and
“small” coefficients are 10% larger or smaller than the optimized coefficients, with the exception of “large gr,”
which is equal to 0.99.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to an inflation target shock
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This figure shows impulse responses to a negative innovation (of one standard deviation) to the inflation target
pi∗t .
24
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a temporary monetary policy shock
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This figure shows impulse responses to an innovation (of one standard deviation) to the temporary monetary
policy shock εrt .
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of inflation target forecast to new information
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This figure shows the optimal updating coefficient (the Kalman gain) for the inflation target forecast as key
parameters vary from the benchmark calibration. Vertical lines denote benchmark values.
26
Figure 4: Sensitivity of temporary policy shock forecast to new information
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This figure shows the optimal updating coefficient (the Kalman gain, multiplied by 1,000) for the temporary
policy shock forecast as key parameters vary from the benchmark calibration. Vertical lines denote benchmark
values.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to an inflation target shock when private agents overestimate
the volatility of the inflation target
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This figure shows impulse responses to a negative innovation (of one standard deviation) to the inflation target
pi∗t when private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target: σˆ∗ = 5 σ∗.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a temporary monetary policy shock when private agents
overestimate the volatility of the inflation target
0 20 40
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
   Consumption    
Full info
Imperfect info
0 20 40
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
   Investment     
0 20 40
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
      Output      
0 20 40
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
    Employment    
0 20 40
−0.1
−0.05
0
    Real wage     
0 20 40
−0.2
−0.1
0
    Inflation     
0 20 40
−0.2
0
0.2
  Interest rate   
0 20 40
−0.2
−0.1
0
Perceived inflation target
0 20 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Perceived temporary shock
This figure shows impulse responses to an innovation (of one standard deviation) to the temporary monetary
policy shock εrt when private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target: σˆ∗ = 5 σ∗.
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